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We are grateful for the critique and comments given by Franz Palm, Rob Alessie, Clemens Kool, 
Jaap Bos, Claire Economidou, Wolter Hassink, Mark Sanders, and Andrea Chegut. Expressed 
views and any remaining errors are our own responsibility.   2 
There is a debate in the United States whether the change in divorce law from fault-
based mutual divorce law to no-fault unilateral divorce law has had an effect on the decision 
to divorce (Peters, 1986; Allen, 1992; Nakonezny et al., 1995; Glenn, 1997; Friedberg, 1998; 
Rodgers et al., 1999; Glenn, 1999; Wolfers, 2006). This debate has its origins in the soaring 
divorce rates during the 1970s. Many believe that this spike in the divorce rate was the result 
of the change in divorce law. However, the empirical results in the extant literature do not 
provide  clear  evidence  of  a  positive  effect  of  the  divorce  law  change  on  divorces. 
Nevertheless, two influential contributions in this Review, the articles of Friedberg (1998) and 
Wolfers (2006), aim to settle the debate. Both studies’ results suggest that the implementation 
of the no-fault unilateral divorce law has had a positive effect on divorce rates. The main 
empirical strength of both papers is the inclusion of controls for the heterogeneity of divorce 
propensities  across  states  and  time  by  using  state-level  panel  data.  Both  papers  utilize 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) by multiplying the variables used in the regression analysis 
by  weights  to  correct  for  heteroskedasticity.  This  heteroskedasticity  is  caused  by  the 
aggregation of the decision to divorce towards state-level divorce rates. However, both papers 
do  not  include  regressions  based  on  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  without  weighting, 
although it is common practice to report these results in addition to WLS.     
In this comment, we replicate the results of Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) and 
show  that  the  estimates  based  on  OLS  without  weighting  do  not  provide  evidence  of  a 
significant  positive  effect  of  the  divorce  law  change  on  divorce  rates.  Therefore,  the 
regression  results  of  Friedberg  (1998)  and  Wolfers  (2006)  cannot  be  used  to  draw  any 
meaningful conclusion on the effect of the regulatory change in divorce law on divorce rates. 
Consequently, there is still no solid evidence that could settle the aforementioned debate in 
favor of the common belief that the no-fault unilateral divorce law has led to more divorces.  
The relationship between divorces and divorce laws is of ongoing interest to policy 
makers and interest groups alike since changes in these laws may have a profound impact on 
the family structure in the United States. In addition, the empirical results are interesting from 
an  economic  point  of  view,  since  they  provide  a  test  of  the  Coase  theorem  in  a  marital 
bargaining  setting.  In  particular,  it  is  argued  that  if  the  divorce  law  change  is  only  a 
redistribution of property rights between spouses, it should not change the efficient bargaining 
solution.
2 Friedberg (1998) finds a strong positive effect of the change in divorce law on 
divorce rates across states. Specifically, the implementation of the no-fault unilateral divorce 
law explains about 17 percent of the increase in divorce rates during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Wolfers (2006) extends the work of Friedberg (1998) using a set of lags to investigate the 
dynamics in the response to the change in divorce law. In particular, according to Wolfers 
(2006) a key problem in the study by Friedberg (1998) is to separate preexisting trends from 
the dynamic response to the change in divorce law. The inclusion of a dynamic response 
function may help to solve this problem. Wolfers (2006) concludes that there is an immediate 
positive  effect  of  the  divorce  law  change  on  the  divorce  rates,  but  finds  that  this  effect 
dissipates  over  time.  Hence,  strictly  speaking,  both  Friedberg  (1998)  and  Wolfers  (2006) 
reject the Coase theorem in marital bargaining setting. 
Friedberg (1998) aggregates the decision to divorce at the individual level towards 
divorce rates at the state level and uses analytical weights based on the state population to 
correct for the heteroskedasticity caused by the aggregation. The same approach has been 
followed by Wolfers (2006) and others (e.g., Gonzáles and Viitanen, 2009). If the proposed 
form of the heteroskedasticity is correct, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) results in efficiency 
gains compared to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors (Huber-White 
                                                           
2 See Friedberg (1998) for a discussion.   3 
sandwich estimator). However, both WLS and OLS should give consistent estimates under 
the  standard  assumptions.  Hence,  similar  parameter  estimates  are  expected  from  both 
estimation methods. 
  
I. The model 
Friedberg (1998) aggregates the marital status, divorced or not divorced, at the state 
level at a particular point in time to obtain the divorce rate: 
1 st st s st divrate unilateral u β α = + +               (1) 
where  divratest  is  the  divorce  rate  (per  thousand  persons),  unilateralst  is  the  divorce  law 
dummy, ust is the error term and s and t are the state and time subscripts. The αs are the state 
fixed  effects  and  capture  average  values  of  demographic  variables  at  the  state  level  (e.g. 
fraction of urban residents and average number of children) that are assumed to remain time 
constant. Wolfers (2006) creates a response function instead, by decomposing the divorce law 
dummy into separate indicators that represent the years after implementation of the divorce 
law change. In addition to the model in equation (1), Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) 
also include year effects and a state-specific linear and quadratic time trend in some of their 
other basic specifications. Moreover, the specifications of Friedberg (1998) include a set of 
dummies to account for coding breaks. 





= ∑ , where the individual error 
terms  ist ε  are aggregated over  st N  individuals per state and divided by the state population in 
thousands ( st pop ).
3  Therefore, Friedberg (1998) argues that ust is heteroskedastic and uses 
population weights as a correction.
4 Wolfers (2006) uses the same approach. The analytical 
weights lead to the following transformed model: 
1 st st st st s st st st divrate pop unilateral pop pop u pop β α = + +       (2) 
The transformation does not change the coefficient of the divorce law dummy. In particular, 
the weights are only used as a correction for heteroskedasticity to obtain correct standard 
errors and efficiency gains. As a result, we expect a consistent parameter estimate of  1 β  after 
performing OLS on both equations (1) and (2).   
 
II. The results 
Table  1  replicates  the  regression  results  of  Friedberg  (1998)  and  Wolfers  (2006). 
Specifically, we use the results of Friedberg (1998) as replicated by Wolfers (2006). The 
estimates of Friedberg (1998) are based on divorce rates between 1968 and 1988. Wolfers 
(2006) uses divorce rate data between 1956 and 1988 in his basic specifications. We report 
the regression estimates with year effects, state fixed effects and state-specific time trends. 
Columns 1 and 3 show the replicated results (i.e. WLS, equation (2)). Columns 2 and 4 report 
the results of Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) without weights (i.e. OLS, equation (1)), 
respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors are used in column 2 and 4 to correct for an 
unknown form of heteroskedasticity.
5 Column 2 indicates that the divorce law dummy is 
insignificant. In addition, column 4 shows that the estimated response function parameters are 
jointly insignificant. These results are not consistent with the findings of Friedberg (1998) and 
Wolfers (2006) as stated in columns 1 and 3.  
                                                           
3 The individual error term is the error term from the microeconomic model with an indicator variable, divorced 
or not divorced, as the dependent variable (see Friedberg, 1998).  
4 Friedberg correctly notices that the aggregation is actually over married women (population of marriages). This 
leads to divorces per population of married women. However, the use of weights based on the population of 
married women does not substantially change the estimates. 
5 This correction does not change the parameter estimates.    4 
Table 2 provides an overview including several preferred specifications of Friedberg 
(1998) and Wolfers (2006) with and without weights. We report the effect of the unilateral 
divorce  law  dummy  used  by  Friedberg  (1998),  the  total  summed  effect  of  the  response 
function utilized by Wolfers (2006) and the short-run effect based on the first four out of eight 
response dummies. This short-run effect is especially of interest as Wolfers (2006) finds a 
dynamic response that is positive in the short-run, but the response diminishes over time and 
even becomes negative  in some specifications. This dynamic response  cannot be inferred 
from the total summed effect. As is evident from the results in Table 2, without analytical 
weights, there is no significant positive effect of the divorce law change on divorce rates in 
any of the basic specifications of Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006).
6 Specifically, the 
short-run and long-run (total) effects are either significantly negative or insignificant.
7  
   
III. Conclusion 
The seminal papers by Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) find a positive effect of 
the regulatory change in divorce laws on divorce rates. Their results are based on analytical 
weights to correct for heteroskedasticity (WLS). In contrast, the OLS regression results in this 
comment  indicate  that  there  is  no  evidence  in  favor  of  a  positive  significant  relationship 
between the divorce law change and divorce rates if those weights are excluded. Estimates 
based on OLS and WLS always differ to some extent due to sampling error. However, the 
large  discrepancies  between  our  results  and  the  results  of  Friedberg  (1998)  and  Wolfers 
(2006) are an indication of functional form or model misspecification. The counterintuitive 
negative  effect  of  the  divorce  law  change  on  divorce  rates  in  some  of  our  and  Wolfers’ 
regression estimates are in line with this explanation. The results in this comment imply that 
economists and policy makers should be cautious when they interpret the results of Friedberg 
(1998) and Wolfers (2006) as evidence of an effect of the divorce law change on divorce 
rates. In particular, their results cannot be used to draw conclusions about the validation of the 
Coase theorem in a marital bargaining setting.  
 
                                                           
6 We obtain similar findings without robust standard errors. Clustered standard errors, to account for possible 
serial correlation, only leads to a positive jointly significant (long-run) effect of the divorce law dummies in the 
specification of Wolfers (2006) with state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends.  
7 This conclusion also holds if we exclude the weights in the specifications of Wolfers (2006) in Table 4, Panel 
A (the extended sample) and Table 5 (robustness testing).    5 
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Table 1–Friedberg and Wolfers with and without weighting 
(dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 persons) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Friedberg  Friedberg  Wolfers  Wolfers 












-  - 
































Controls         
Year FE  F=95.3  F=68.8  F=53.9  F=57.4 
State FE  F=191.6  F=173  F=468.2  F=519.7 
State * time  F=24.4  F=17.9  F=49.4  F=30.7 
F-value divorce 
dummies 
-  -  F=19.8  F=1.0 
Sample  1968-1988, n=1043  1956-1988, n=1631 
Notes:  ***,**,*  significance  at  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  respectively.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  In  the 
specifications without population weights, we use Huber-White robust standard errors. All replications are based 
on the estimates of Wolfers (2006). For specification (1) of Friedberg see Wolfers (2006) Table 1, specification 
(2).  For  specification  (3)  of  Wolfers  see  Wolfers  (2006)  Table  2,  specification  (2).  The  specifications  of 
Friedberg (1998) include a set of dummies to account for coding breaks. 
 
   7 
Table 2–Overview basic specifications Friedberg and Wolfers 
(dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 persons) 
  With analytical weights  Without analytical weights  
Friedberg:  
With state fixed effects 
Total effect:0.0003 
t-value:0.01 




Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Wolfers:  












Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Short-run effect:-1.370  
F-value: 2.70 
Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Friedberg:  
With state fixed effects, and with 








Significant at 5%: yes/no 
Wolfers:  
With state fixed effects, and with 




Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Short-run effect:1.284   
F-value: 8.65 




Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Short-run effect: 0.779 
F-value: 1.18 
Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Friedberg:  
With state fixed effects, with 





Significant at 5%: yes/no 
Total effect:0.143 
t-value:1.59 
Significant at 5%: yes/no 
Wolfers:  
With state fixed effects, with 





Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Short-run effect:1.233   
F-value: 8.49 




Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Short-run effect: 0.050 
F-value: 0.61 
Significant at 5%: yes/no 
 
Notes: All specifications are based on the results stated in Wolfers (2006). The column with analytical weights 
uses the specifications as stated in Table 1 (the results of Friedberg) and Table 2 (the results of Wolfers) reported 
in Wolfers (2006). The replicated results of Friedberg (1998) are based on the sample between 1968 and 1988. 
Her specifications include a set of dummies to account for coding breaks. We use the sample between 1956 and 
1988 to replicate the regression results of Wolfers (2006). For Wolfers’ own specifications we show the total 
effect and the joint significance of the set of deregulation dummies, not the significance of the aggregated total 
effect. In addition, we report the short-run effect based on the sum of the first four divorce law dummies: first 2 
years, years 3-4, years 5-6, and years 7-8. For the Friedberg specifications we show the t-value of the unilateral 
dummy. In the specifications without population weights, we use Huber-White robust standard errors. 
 
  
 